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 Describing his business plans as early as 1909, 
Henry Ford’s intentions to “build a motor car for the 
great multitude” were as clear as ever (Jackson, 1985). He 
envisioned this car, affordable to any man making a good 
salary, to enable him to “enjoy with his family the blessings 
of  hours of  pleasure in God’s great open spaces” (Jackson, 
1985). Contrarily, the great motor-accessibility that Ford 
offered American markets made necessary the literal 
concretization of   “God’s great open spaces,” and in doing 
so paved the way for the decline of  many American cities, 
Ford’s own Detroit in particular. As if  burdened with the 
legacy of  his grandfather’s creation in all its capacity to 
fuel the decline of  the city out of  which it rose, as CEO of  
Ford Motors, Henry Ford II in his own words, “heartily” 
endorsed the Detroit People Mover in 1976 from the 
removed comfort of  his Dearborn headquarters (SEMTA, 
1976). The public light-rail, which currently makes an 
elevated 2.9-mile loop around the city’s Central Business 
District, was intended as a means of  reconnecting areas 
of  the city sliced up by freeways and parking lots, in hopes 
of  triggering economic revitalization. However, in all of  
its potential to revitalize through linking buildings and 
activity centers with shops and offices, the People Mover 
is itself  the product of  failed linkages. The story of  its 
conception, construction and controversy points towards 
the geographical-made-ideological, urban-suburban, auto-
enabled division which prevented its incorporation into 
a larger transit system and therefore compromised any 
potential for the rail to act as the “savior of  a dying city” 
that many optimistic Michigan residents had imagined 
(Wilkerson, 1987).
   “People Movers” appeared as a potential urban 
transportation solution during the spring of  1972. In 
Chantilly, VA four private companies showcased their 
versions of  what were technically referred to as “Personal 
Rapid Transit” systems (Witkins, 1972). Granted 1.5 
million each in development funds by the Department of  
Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA), four private 
contractors, one of  which was Ford Motors, offered 
alternative versions of  a six to thirty person, gondola-
like vehicle and guide way system that would “help rescue 
urban America from strangulation by automobile traffic” 
(Witkins, 1972). In a nation addicted to the ever-convenient 
“freedom of  mobility” granted by auto use, planners 
anticipated the “personal” taxi-like nature of  the people 
mover concept to be an attractive public transportation 
alternative to personal vehicle users (Witkins, 1972). 
Throughout the country, politicians envisioned that the 
implementation of  a successful downtown People Mover 
model would warrant a car ban in congested downtown 
areas for the first time in history: a move that could allow 
for the return to mixed-use streets as opposed to the “no-
man’s-land” traffic brutalized areas that had become the 
urban American norm (Duany et al., 2000).
  Four years later, President Gerald Ford offered 
the Southeast Michigan Transportation Authority 
(SEMTA) $600 million for the construction of  a rail transit 
system, allowing the region a great deal of  freedom to 
draft and deploy a coherent system of  mass transportation 
(Michigan House of  Representatives). Under these 
circumstances, the People Mover appeared to be a winning 
component of  a larger system and was overwhelmingly 
supported by then Governor William Milliken, both 
houses of  Michigan’s legislature, SEMTA, as well as the 
Central Business District Association (Michigan House 
of  Representatives). The project made particular sense 
in light of  the specific problems outlined by SEMTA’s 
proposal, which identified traffic congestion within the 
Central Business District as a significant factor in its lack 
of  appeal to visitors and pedestrians. At the time, vehicles 
entered the district from three freeway-bordered sides, 
and a fourth side from the Detroit River Tunnel (SEMTA, 
1976). Within such a small and confined area, where on 
and off  ramps were concentrated amidst one-way streets 
and numerous parking lots, drivers had to be significantly 
“well oriented” if  they were to successfully navigate the 
area. Likewise, only “well oriented” pedestrians could 
navigate the district without putting themselves in danger 
(SEMTA, 1976). 
 How could an area with these problems expect 
to allure visitors, shoppers, diners or any sort of  reliable 
economic activity? The SEMTA proposal made the People 
Mover out to be a solution to this congestive demise. In 
addition to its “major aesthetic appeal,” the People Mover 
would attempt to separate vehicular and pedestrian activity, 
locating parking lots outside of  the 13 planned stations 
and freeing up land previously used as parking space for 
higher density use (SEMTA, 1976). The elevated railway 
was planned to act as a pedestrian friendly matrix between 
major activity nodes such as the Renaissance Center, Joe 
Louis Arena and the Cobo Center (SEMTA, 1976). In 
theory, such drastically improved mobility would further 
stimulate total demand for trips within downtown.
 Quantified, the projected benefits of  Detroit’s 
People Mover were equally if  not more impressive. 
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Economists anticipated an increase of  10.6 million in 
retail sales in addition to significant increases in property 
tax revenue due to the intensive development of  the city’s 
core. Additionally, the surge in income tax revenue due to 
employment gains was expected to reach seventeen million 
per year (SEMTA, 1976). Generating $6 to $11.1 for every 
dollar expended on the initial capital cost, the presumed 
self-sufficient People Mover, at least in SEMTA’s report, 
appeared to truly exhibit potential to “serve as an extremely 
important catalyst in the continuing plan to enhance and 
revitalize Detroit” (SEMTA, 1976). 
 Recognizing that a lack of  high quality transit 
service to the Central Business District (CBD) was 
responsible “at least in part, for the declining position 
of  the CBD as the major regional activity center,” a 
crucial component to the proposed People Mover was its 
intended use as a link between present and future modes 
of  transportation. Released in 1974 and approved by 
SEMTA in 1979, the Southeast Regional Transportation 
Plan envisioned a coordinated hierarchy of  transit systems 
comprised of  five major components (Michigan House 
of  Representatives). The detailed plan included six 
rapid-transit corridor guide ways connecting the major 
activity centers in the Southeast metropolitan region 
complemented by 179 miles of  radial and circumferential 
rapid transit bus lines within the same area (SEMTA, 
1976). A commuter rail would provide service beyond 
the range of  the metropolitan system, and buses would 
fill in the gaps by providing increased sub-regional and 
community level routes (SEMTA, 1976). Given these 
four constructs, SEMTA planned for the People Mover 
to collect and distribute riders of  the bus and rail system, 
thereby expanding the cohesion and area of  influence of  
the system in its entirety.
 As promising as this Regional Transportation Plan 
appeared in 1976, the People Mover is the only component 
that has since materialized, and illogically so. From 1970 to 
1975, years during which the People Mover concept was 
in its formative stages, the population in Wayne, Oakland 
and Macomb counties remained unchanged (Wayne and 
Oakland County Road Commission, 1977). However 
over the course of  these five years, the three counties 
saw a dramatic shift in population from Wayne County, 
which had a -5.6 percent growth rate over the period, to 
Oakland and Macomb counties, which grew by 7.2 and 7.0 
percent respectively (Wayne and Oakland County Road 
Commission, 1977). Given Wayne County’s significant 
population loss over this five year period, the last thing the 
Southeast region needed was a 2.9 mile elevated railway 
that allowed only Detroit’s remaining million residents to 
ride around in circles, basking in the absence of  their tax 
dollars. Rather than circulating in isolation, Detroit needed 
some sort of  physical lifeline—be it a connection to jobs 
outside the city or the facilitation of  tax dollars generated by 
city visitors. Various committees proposed regional transit 
plans only to be neglected and then dismissed in 1979, 
again in 1984 and once more in 1985 (Michigan House of  
Representatives). Meanwhile the People Mover continued 
moving through its many phases of  development, and was 
completed in1987. 
  Skeptical of  the People Mover’s ability to truly 
benefit Detroit, UMTA officials within the Reagan 
administration attempted to eliminate federal money 
allotted for the light-rail in 1985 (Detroit Free Press, 
1987). Yet despite the continual decline of  daily ridership 
projections, which had fallen from 55,000 to 16,000 by 
the People Mover’s opening day on July 31, 1987, mayor 
Coleman Young’s perseverance won back federal money 
for the project (Detroit Free Press, 2000). Despite the 
symbolic value of  its completion, the entire process was 
laden with technical problems ranging from cracked and 
shattered concrete beams and broken glass, to a year-long 
service disruption resulting from the Hudson building 
demolition in 1998 (Detroit Free Press, 1999). During the 
thirteen months of  disrupted service in 1998, dramatically 
longer riding times made ridership plummet from the 
already low 8,000 per day to an excruciating 1,500 upon 
its reopening in 1999 (Detroit Free Press, 1999). Soon 
after, a General Motors effort to improve the Renaissance 
Center People Mover station closed the loop for a short 
period of  time, requiring its riders to use a much less 
convenient two-way shuttle leaving one Detroit Free Press 
interviewee to wonder “if  the elevated light-rail system 
will ever live up to its promise as a lynchpin for a much 
needed mass transit system” (2000). A 1987 article in the 
New York Times attributed the inability to incorporate the 
People Mover into a larger rail system to cost overruns 
and the drying up of  Federal transportation funds. While 
requiring significantly more capital than initially projected, 
the People Mover consumed 157.2 million, roughly one 
quarter of  the 600 million Gerald Ford had originally 
offered in 1976 (Detroit Free Press, 2000). Squandered on 
carelessly planned and poorly designed projects intended 
to strengthen the People Mover’s route, 442.8 million of  
President Ford’s initial grant remains unaccounted for 
(Detroit Free Press, 2000). 
 Though structural and cosmetic construction 
are important when considering both the quality of  life 
in Detroit as well as the city’s ability to allure visitors, no 
such project, regardless of  its intent, should have been 
permitted to stand in the way of  any component of  the 
city’s day-to-day functionality. Had regional oversight been 
involved, adherence to a shared goal of  connection and 
a focus placed on the equitable and efficient distribution 
of  funds to the People Mover project would have likely 
resulted in fewer segments of  useless train track, and a 
chance for a successful, better incorporated light-rail in the 
long-term.
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 Along Alter Road in Detroit runs a wall dividing 
“Disneyland” and “West Beirut,” or wealthy, neatly 
trimmed, largely white Grosse Point from the poor, burned 
out, primarily black East Side of  the city (Jackson, 1985). 
Physically separate from the city so in need of  a regional 
transit lifeline, suburbanites appear perfectly happy within 
the bubble in which they have chosen to live. In a market 
opinion survey conducted in 1976, Southeastern Michigan 
suburbanites expressed their contentment with remaining 
physically and economically within the suburbs they had 
fled to. For work and shopping trips, the two activities 
that most frequently require transportation, the majority 
of  those surveyed expressed greater personal utility for 
improved in-county public transportation rather than out-
county public transportation. The survey shows that 88% 
of  participants in Wayne County, 76% of  participants in 
Oakland County, and 73% of  participants in Macomb 
County expressed such desire (Wayne and Oakland County 
Road Commission). Yet these opinions are largely the 
product of  pragmatism: zoning regulations responsible 
for the many dense shopping facilities that characterize 
suburbia make shopping trips in downtown Detroit largely 
impractical.
  When regional transit system concepts have been 
proposed, as in 1979, 1984 and 1985, taxpayers accustomed 
to using their personal vehicles resent the allotment of  their 
tax dollars to a system that they do not intend to utilize 
and often heavily oppose construction of  local transit 
links (SEMCOG, 2000). 
The few transportation 
connections to and from 
Detroit that do exist 
have been the first to 
be eliminated in times 
of  economic hardship. 
For example, in attempt 
to save some $10.5 million during a 1975 budget deficit, 
SEMTA eliminated seven daily trips from its service: three 
of  which connected Crocker to Detroit, and three of  
which connected Jefferson Beach to Detroit (Gross Point 
News 1974). When paired with auto-enabled suburban 
independence from the city, the elimination of  rider 
sourcing by way of  bus route removal makes a mockery 
of  the empty People Mover, which cannot play the part 
of  collector/distributer of  people if  there is no collection 
or distribution to be made. As anticipated by one resident 
on the day of  its opening, disconnected from the suburbs, 
the People Mover is nothing more than a “nice looking 
Stonehenge” (Wilkerson, 1987). 
  Politicians have also played an integral role in the 
prevention of  a consolidated, functional regional transit 
system in Southeast Michigan. Former Republican House 
Speaker Craig DeRoche is a perfect example of  a blatant 
impediment to cohesion between Detroit and its suburbs 
(Schneider, 2005). Not even attempting subtlety, DeRoche 
identified himself  in 2004 as a “representative of  sprawl” 
(Schneider, 2005). With the majority of  his campaign 
contributions coming from energy, real estate, concrete, 
utility and development companies, DeRoche earmarked 
a significant portion of  Michigan’s annual $10 million of  
economic development funds for new highways and other 
auto-oriented projects outside of  Detroit throughout his 
three terms (Schneider, 2005). By crafting the policies and 
controlling the funds responsible for sprawl, politicians 
like DeRoche fuel a perpetual cycle disallowing the 
implementation of  regional public transportation projects 
like that released by SEMTA in 1974 (Michigan House 
of  Representatives). With a significant portion of  tax 
dollars allotted to development by politicians’ campaign 
donors in the outermost suburbs, newer, well-maintained 
infrastructure naturally allures mobile residents out of  the 
city and its inner suburbs. As people spread out over vast 
amounts of  space and grow increasingly dependent on the 
1.6 million cars that have been added to the road since 
1970, public transportation becomes both less rational 
and less desirable in the eyes of  suburban taxpayers and 
their representatives (Schneider, 2005). In 2007, suburban 
Livingston County’s unemployment rate was 5.2 percent 
with 5.5 percent of  households earning an income under 
$14,999 per year (US Census, 2007). In stark contrast, 
Detroit’s 2007 unemployment rate was 11.7 percent, and 
28.1 percent of  households earned under $14,999 (US 
Census, 2007). As the physical 
space between the suburbs 
and the city grows, trips past 
the Alter road division are less 
rational and less desirable for 
affluent suburban dwellers 
living nearby. Meanwhil,e city 
dwellers find car ownership 
the key to mobility beyond their means. With politicians 
like DeRoche “standing for sprawl,” what are Detroiters 
stranded in the city, literally without inlet our outlet 
supposed to do?
  The Southeastern Michigan Council of  
Governments (SEMCOG), a regional planning partnership 
whose mission is “to solve regional problems by improving 
the efficiency and effectiveness of  the region’s local 
governments,” has played no lesser a role in preventing 
a coherent system of  regional public transportation 
than the politicians it aims to coordinate. In theory, 
SEMCOG facilitates cooperation between 147 local 
governments, institutions and state and federal agencies 
(Schneider, 2004). However, in practice, delegates within 
the organization are principally loyal to the desires of  
their constituents at the expense of  intended cooperation 
and regional transportation. Systematic in its approach to 
seeing local projects through, constituents active within 
“... the last thing the region needed 
was a 2.9 mile elevated railway 
for Detroit’s remaining residents to 
ride around in circles, basking in 
the absence of their tax dollars.”
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SEMCOG nominate projects that are discussed and given 
priority by an advisory committee (Schneider, 2004). Once 
nominated, selected projects are passed on to SEMCOG’s 
executive committee, which retains the ultimate say in 
project decisions and in how much money each receives. 
The problem with this system is one of  disproportionate 
representation. Within the 51 member executive 
committee, a sparsely populated new suburban area like 
Livingston County has four votes to represent its 172,000 
residents. Detroit, a city containing a population more 
than five times the size of  all of  Livingston County has 
a mere three representatives on the executive committee 
despite its 920,000 residents. The consequences are far 
reaching. Despite the fact that a third of  the Southeast 
region’s residents don’t drive, only $145 million per year 
is given to the region’s two bus lines while amounts of  
one to two billion are spent just to widen single portions 
of  Interstate-75 because of  auto-dependent suburban 
overrepresentation (Schneider, 2004). Though in a 2000 
conference report SEMCOG members brought to 
attention the need for increased general connectivity of  
regional public transit, the overrepresentation of  suburban 
delegates on an executive committee possessing the power 
to deny funding to regional makes the materialization of  a 
coherent public transportation system unlikely without a 
fundamental shift in attitude.
 Indicative of  Southeastern Michigan’s notorious 
uncooperativeness, during a visit to Detroit in mid-
October of  this year, US Transportation Secretary Ray 
LaHood made his message clear: “get your act together 
regionally, or forget help from Washington” (Gerritt, 
2009). Until Michigan’s private and public sectors share 
in the realization that the urban-suburban divide has 
been actively broken and public money should be turned 
towards the strengthening and connecting of  the central 
city and its existing suburbs, Detroit’s People Mover will 
remain “no more than a tail without a dog” (Detroit Free 
Press, 1987). Presently, a regional high-speed rail running 
from Ann Arbor to Detroit with stops in Ypsilanti, Detroit 
Metro Airport, and Dearborn is scheduled to begin service 
in October of  2010 (SEMCOG, 2009). Though exciting 
indeed, once functional, this commuter rail will comprise 
only one of  many corridors recurrently planned and 
dismissed. This collaboration must persist into the future to 
ensure the fruition of  a comprehensive mass transit system 
which would truly allow for, in Henry Ford’s words, the 
“great multitude” to “enjoy with his family the blessings 
of  hours of  pleasure.” Only in the event of  collaborative 
success will there be people to follow the People Mover 
brochure’s suggestion to “Go! See! Shop! Eat!” in the 
downtown area. Only under these circumstances can 
Detroit and the People Mover’s empty, isolated 2.9-mile 
loop of  perpetuity be broken.
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